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Preserving Local Autonomy in the
Face of Municipal Financial Crisis:
Reconciling Rhode Island's Response
to the Central Falls Financial Crisis
with the State's Home Rule Tradition
Katherine Newby Kishfy*
INTRODUCTION
A. Municipal Insolvency: Central Falls' Financial Crisis and a
Rapid State Response
On May 19, 2010, the "City with a Bright Future," but many
financial problems, achieved a Rhode Island first: with the
approval of the City Council, the City's Mayor petitioned the
Rhode Island Superior Court for judicial receivership claiming
that the City was insolvent.1 The Superior Court Justice
acquiesced to the distressed municipality's request and appointed
a temporary receiver for the City, who, it was hoped, would be
able to relieve some of the strain on the City's coffers by
* Candidate Juris Doctor, Roger Williams University School of Law, 2012;
M.Ed. Lesley University, 2008; A.B. Brown University, 2006. The author
would like to express her appreciation and gratitude to her friends,
colleagues, editors, mentors, and everyone else who contributed to this piece
in direct and indirect ways. Special thanks to Nick and Emma for their
unconditional support throughout the process.
1. See John Hill, City in Receivership, PROVIDENCE J., May 20, 2010, at
Al [hereinafter City in Receivership]. Although other Rhode Island
municipalities, as well as Central Falls itself, have previously faced extreme
financial strain, none has actually petitioned for bankruptcy or receivership.
Id.
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negotiating new, more favorable contract terms, particularly with
regard to municipal employees.2 At the time, Central Falls was
facing an "extraordinary" financial emergency - the City projected
a budget shortfall of $3,000,000 for the 2010 fiscal year and
$5,000,000 in 2011.3 Additionally, the City had municipal bond
indebtedness of $10,000,000 and accrued pension liability
exceeding $35,000,000, but no funds to satisfy over $1,500,000 in
pension fund obligations due during the 2010 fiscal year.
4
Looking down the barrel of "extreme fiscal stress," the City
Council passed a Resolution allowing the Mayor to file a
receivership petition. 5 Central Falls' capital market rating was
immediately downgraded to junk bond status, 6 and state officials
were informed that as a result of the judicial receivership, "capital
markets would view debt financing to Rhode Island municipalities
as extremely risky and it would become more expensive for
municipalities to borrow in the capital markets."7
State officials, who were apparently uninvolved in the
decision to file for receivership, immediately set the gears in
2. See id.
3. See Pfeiffer v. Moreau, C.A. No. PB 10-5615, slip op. at 6 (R.I. Super.
Ct. Oct. 18, 2010), available at http://www.courts.state.ri.us/superior/pdf/10-
5615.pdf. Financial strife is not a new phenomenon in Central Falls. In fact,
in 1991 when the city faced a similar financial crises, the Rhode Island
General Assembly passed an act entitled "Central Falls - Fiscal Emergency
Act" after determining that "the public health and welfare of the citizens of
Central Falls and of this state would be adversely affected by the insolvency
of the local government of Central Falls," such that state intervention was
necessary to "protect the credit of the state and its political subdivisions."
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-52.1-1 (repealed 2005). In that instance, the General
Assembly implemented a financial review commission comprised of a variety
of state and local stakeholders to assist the city in identifying and
implementing measures that would lead to a balanced budget. R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 45-52.1-3 (repealed 2005).
4. Pfeiffer, C.A. No. PB 10-5615, at 6.
5. Id. at 7.
6. Black's Law Dictionary defines a junk bond as "[a] high-risk, high-
yield subordinated bond issued by a company with a credit rating below
investment grade." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 204 (9th ed. 2009). Junk bonds
are generally considered to be risky investments because they are heavily
subordinated and, as such, they often carry higher-than-normal interest
rates.
7. See Pfeiffer, C.A. No. PB 10-5615, at 7; John Hill, Ratings agency cuts
bond rating to junk status, PROVIDENCE J., May 22, 2010, at A4 [hereinafter
Ratings agency].
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motion to regain control of the situation.8 Even though then-
existing Rhode Island law provided for a financial oversight
mechanism whereby the state's director of revenue could install a
Budget and Review Commission to oversee municipal finances,
the triggering conditions had apparently not yet been met. 9
Rhode Island's Governor publicly voiced his concerns about the
effect that the receivership could have on other municipalities and
on the state as a whole, while others in the state government
feared that Central Falls' receivership petition could "trigger a
domino effect" of additional receivership petitions among other
struggling Rhode Island cities and towns.10  The General
Assembly sprang into action, hoping to remove Central Falls from
receivership, passing "An Act Relating to Cities and Towns -
Providing Financial Stability," that would apply retroactively to
be effective as of several days prior to Central Falls' receivership
petition.ll The day after the Governor signed the bill into law, the
state's director of revenue exercised her new powers under the
statute, appointing a permanent non-judicial Receiver for the
city.12 In response, the Central Falls Mayor and City Council
withdrew their motion for the appointment of a permanent
judicial Receiver and began the transition to a non-judicial
receivership provided for by the new legislation.13
All was not well on the public opinion front, however. An
8. See Ratings agency, supra note 7.
9. R.I. GEN. LAws § 45-9-3(a)(1) (1956), amended by R.I. GEN. LAWS §§
45-9-1 to -17 (2010); City in Receivership, supra note 1. Under that law, the
budget commission process could be initiated by the state director of revenue
only if the municipality's bond credit rating had been downgraded below
investment grade and there was an imminent threat of default on municipal
debt obligations. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-9-3. Moreover, even if the City's
financial situation warranted state intervention at that point, it appeared as
though Central Falls would have resisted the installation of a budget
commission based on the opinion of its primary legal advisor at the time that
the process would take too long and would not allow the City to impose new
contract terms to the same extent as receivership would. See City in
Receivership, supra note 1.
10. Steve Peoples & John Hill, Receivership could set off domino effect,
officials say, PROVIDENCE J., May 21, 2010, at Al.
11. See R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 45-9-1 to -17 (2010); Pfeiffer, C.A. No. PB 10-
5615, at 7-9; John Hill, State reviewing how to proceed with city's finances,
PROVIDENCE J., June 12, 2010, at A7 [hereinafter State reviewing].
12. Pfeiffer, C.A. No. PB 10-5615, at 4.
13. Id. at 3-4.
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editorial published by The Providence Journal in the days
following Central Falls' initial receivership petition expressed
dismay with the City's elected officials, lamenting that "[n]ow,
power has been taken away from them - and the voters - and
given to an unelected receiver." 14 Several weeks after the City
entered receivership, Rhode Island's chapter of the American Civil
Liberties Union raised questions as to the constitutionality of the
new legislation under the Home Rule provision in the state's
constitution. 15
Against this backdrop, tensions escalated between the
recently elected Mayor and City Council on one side, and the
state-appointed Receiver on the other, after the Receiver
requested that the Mayor relinquish his City vehicle and his keys
to city hall, reduced his salary, and informed him that his role
moving forward would be purely advisory. 16 The power struggle
between the two culminated in a courtroom showdown after both
the Mayor and the Receiver attempted to appoint different
individuals to the Central Falls Housing Authority Board. 17 The
Receiver filed suit seeking a determination from the court that the
new legislation was constitutional and injunctive relief against
both the Mayor and members of the City Council, who he claimed
were interfering with his official actions as Receiver.18 Within
days, the Mayor and City Council members countered with their
own suit, challenging the constitutionality of the legislation on
sundry grounds and seeking to restrain the Receiver from further
action in his capacity under the statute. 19 The two suits were
consolidated, and the hearing justice found for the Receiver,
rejecting arguments that the Act was unconstitutional, and
finding that the Receiver had acted within the scope of his
authority.20 The Mayor and City Council members took an appeal
on the constitutional issues, and the case is currently pending
14. EditoriaL" Into receivership, PROVIDENCE J., May 27, 2010, at A6.
15. See John Hill, ACLU raises questions about receivership law,
PROVIDENCE J., July 24, 2010, at Al.
16. See Pfeiffer, C.A. No. PB 10-5614, at 4 & n.3.
17. See id. at 4-5.
18. See id. at 5.
19. See id. at 5-6.
20. Id. at 47-48.
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before the Rhode Island Supreme Court.21
This Comment will compare Rhode Island's new municipal
insolvency statute to the state's previous budget commission
provision, both with reference to the pending constitutionality
issue as well as its strengths and weaknesses as an economic
policy, and will argue that although the statute is likely
constitutional and incorporates an appropriate level of local
participation on its face, as implemented in Central Falls' case, it
does not comport with the democratic ideals embodied in Rhode
Island's Home Rule provision. Furthermore, because the Act
severely limits local participation in the budgetary reform process,
it hinders long-term economic improvement in Central Falls. Part
I of this Comment will explore the various legal mechanisms that
have developed over time to resolve municipal financial crises, the
nexus between opportunities for local input and lasting budgetary
reform, and the legal framework under which Rhode Island's
Home Rule Amendment, the primary guarantor of local
governance, has been interpreted by the Rhode Island Supreme
Court. Part II will analyze the new statute, its constitutionality
under the Home Rule Amendment, and the practical implications
of its policies and structure. Part III will offer policy
recommendations for responding to municipal financial crises in a
manner that maximizes the opportunity for local input, and
comports with the democratic values underlying Rhode Island's
Home Rule guarantee. Finally, Part IV will provide concluding
remarks.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Snapshot of Municipal Insolvency - A Historical Framework
Prior to the Great Depression, neither the federal government
nor most states had enacted general legislation to deal with
municipal insolvency or bankruptcy in any uniform fashion. 22
21. John Hill, Court hears Moreau appeal, PROVIDENCE J., Feb. 2, 2011,
at A4 [hereinafter Court hears appeal]. The Supreme Court heard oral
arguments on February 1, 2011, but as of the date of this writing, has yet to
issue a decision in the case. See id.
22. Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A
Conceptual Introduction to Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 427
(1993). Prior to 1938, the Supreme Court generally held that the Contracts
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Instead, municipal insolvency issues were generally governed by
state and federal common law. 23 Although cities frequently
defaulted on debt obligations even prior to the widespread
financial crisis of the Great Depression, there was no standardized
bankruptcy code providing creditors' remedies, and instead
creditors relied on judicially crafted remedies such as seizure of
municipal or resident owned property, garnishment of city tax
revenue, judicial imposition of new taxes, and judicial oversight of
expenditures to prevent diversion from debt obligations. 24 One
key issue in these early cases was whether the same level of
judicial oversight that was typical in private bankruptcy contexts
extended to the municipal insolvency setting as well.2 5 For
example, while bankruptcy provisions for private entities allowed
court supervision over the day-to-day affairs and expenditures of a
debtor, the Supreme Court had established that with respect to
public entities, "the question [of] what expenditures are proper
and necessary for the municipal administration, is not judicial; it
is confided by law to the discretion of the municipal authorities.
No court has the right to control that discretion." 26 Thus, even in
Clause prevented states from enacting legislation that would readjust
municipal debt, and principles of state autonomy embodied in the Tenth
Amendment prevented the federal government from doing so as well. See id.
at 427-28. In fact, the Supreme Court struck down Congress's first attempt
at a federal municipal bankruptcy provision because it impermissibly
intruded on state sovereignty. Ashton v. Cameron Cnty. Dist., 298 U.S. 513,
531 (1936).
23. McConnell & Picker, supra note 22, at 429.
24. Id. Although many of these remedies were analogous to traditional
creditor's remedies against private entities, in the municipal context they
were applied in a modified manner. Id. For example, in the private setting,
creditors could seize debtor property for the purpose of satisfying obligations,
but with municipal debtors, the Public Trust Doctrine typically prevented
courts from permitting the seizure of property that was held for the public
good. Id. at 430-31; see, e.g., Town of Farmerville v. Commercial Credit Co.,
136 So. 82, 85 (La. 1931) (noting that "'an execution cannot be levied on any
property held by a municipality or other public corporation for public
purposes, ... the principle being that title to such property is held in trust for
the public."') (citation omitted).
25. McConnell & Picker, supra note 22, at 434-35.
26. East St. Louis v. Zebley, 110 U.S. 321, 324 (1884). Similarly, in
rejecting a creditor's attempt to enforce a debt against a city, the Court of
Appeal of Louisiana noted that "the framing of their budgets seems to be a
matter which is left to the discretion of the town councils, and courts are
without authority to regulate them in preparing or supplementing the same."
2011] 353
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the context of pre-statutory mechanisms for addressing with
municipal insolvency, issues of municipal sovereignty were at the
forefront of the debate, and the judiciary demonstrated a
reluctance to invade the traditionally political areas of municipal
taxing and spending, holding instead that absent statutory
authority to appoint a receiver, it was inappropriate for a court to
assert control over municipal operations analogous to that which a
court could exert over a private debtor.27
Eventually, a handful of states responded to this uncertainty
by providing statutorily for municipal receivers or financial
oversight boards that had the authority to make changes to taxing
and expenditures within the municipality. 28 New England states
took a particularly novel approach, enforcing municipal debt
directly against residents based on the rationale that because
[t]owns, parishes, [and] precincts . . . [ ] are but a
collection of individuals with certain corporate powers for
political and civil purposes, without any corporate fund
from which a judgment can be satisfied... each member
of the community is liable in his person or estate to the
execution which may issue against the body.29
In some instances, states took responsibility for municipal debt
under the theory that cities and towns are but creatures of the
state, "[b]ut it was never thought that states had a legal obligation
Bullis v. Town of Jackson, 4 So.2d 550, 553 (La. Ct. App. 1941).
27. See McConnell & Picker, supra note 22, at 436.
28. Id. For example, when Memphis became plagued by creditors' suits
as a result of the city's chronic inability to collect taxes, Tennessee passed an
act abolishing the City of Memphis as a municipal corporation, instead
incorporating city property, assets, and residents into the body of the state,
and appointing a receiver to manage tax collection and expenditures.
Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U.S. 472, 502-04, 508 (1880). Subsequently, in a
consolidated suit brought by a variety of Memphis's creditors, a federal court
appointed its own receiver to manage tax collection, payment of debt, and
municipal expenditure, those greatly in excess of powers previously vested
with any such judicial officer. Id. at 508. While the Supreme Court affirmed
the authority of the state to repeal the charter of the municipality and
appoint a receiver, reasoning that that the municipality is a "mere
instrumentalit[y] of the State for the more convenient administration of local
government," the Court held that in appointing its own receiver, the federal
judge impermissibly encroached upon the prerogative of the state legislature.
Id. at 511, 521.
29. See Meriwether, 102 U.S. at 519; Merchants Bank v. Cook, 21 Mass.
405, 414 (1826); McConnell & Picker, supra note 22, at 437.
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to do these things, or that states stood behind the debts of their
cities."30
However, in response to an ever-increasing need for a uniform
approach during the Great Depression, 31 as well as the holdout
problem that developed when creditors were permitted to proceed
individually rather than as a group, in 1937 Congress enacted
what was intended to be a temporary emergency measure
providing a federal municipal bankruptcy mechanism. 32 By 1946,
the provision was made permanent, eventually evolving into
Chapter 9 of the Federal Bankruptcy Code, and is currently one of
several debt restructuring devices available to insolvent
municipalities. 33 In recent years, several large cities have faced
financial crises that have prompted either bankruptcy filing or
some other form of state intervention. 34 In addition to the highly
publicized insolvencies of several major American cities, twenty-
30. McConnell & Picker, supra note 22, at 442-43.
31. During the run up to the Great Depression, the value of property
increased rapidly, leading to increased property tax revenue, and prompting
municipalities to expand municipal services and obtain long-term loans to
finance infrastructure improvements. Omer Kimhi, Chapter 9 of the
Bankruptcy Code: A Solution in Search of a Problem, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 351,
362 (2010) [hereinafter Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code]. However, when
the stock market later crashed and the real estate values plummeted,
municipalities found themselves unable to cover municipal debts and
obligations. Id. at 362-63.
32. McConnell & Picker, supra note 22, at 428. One of the bill's
supporters described the holdout problem that occurred when municipal
creditors jockeyed to position themselves favorably: "[i]n every instance
where a governmental unit finds itself in financial difficulty and is able to
make some satisfactory agreement of adjustment with the majority of its
creditors, there is always a small minority who hold out and demand
preferential treatment." Id. at 450 (quoting Hearing on HR 1670, HR 3083,
HR 4311, HR 5009, and HR 5267 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 73d
Cong., 1st Sess. 86 (1933) (statement of Rep. J. Mark Wilcox)). Therefore, to
the extent that a collective process can be forced upon creditors, a holdout
will not receive a disproportionate benefit as a reward for his for failure to go
along with the group. Id.
33. Id. at 428, 450, 454.
34. Charles K. Coe, Preventing Local Government Fiscal Crises:
Emerging Best Practices, 68 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 759, 759 (2008). Among the
major American cities that have experienced acute financial crises requiring
some form of intervention are New York, New York (1975); Cleveland, Ohio
(1978); Bridgeport, Connecticut (1991); Yonkers, New York (1975 and 1988);
Orange County, California (1994), Miami, Florida (1996), and Pittsburg,
Pennsylvania (2003). Id.
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six states have reported that at least one municipality has
experienced financial crisis in recent years. 3 5
B. A Catalog of Responses - Current Approaches to Municipal
Insolvency
Today, there are three primary approaches to dealing with
creditors' claims in the face of municipal insolvency. 36 The first is
through the traditional creditors remedies, similar to those that
were utilized prior to Congressional enactment of the municipal
bankruptcy code, which have analogs in private debt contexts. 37
As noted above, many of the traditional remedies are often of little
use to municipal creditors because while a creditor of a private
entity may be able to seize an asset for sale, legislatures and
many courts have precluded creditors from similarly seizing
municipal property and financial assets.38 However, some courts
have been willing to issue writs of mandamus, compelling a
municipality to levy taxes in order to satisfy specific debts, and
forcing the municipality's residents to indirectly foot the bill for
the debt. 39
The second avenue for creditor recovery is provided for by the
Chapter 9 of the Federal Bankruptcy Code. 40  Importantly,
municipalities are not subject to involuntary bankruptcy, and the
federal Bankruptcy Code sets forth additional threshold
requirements for municipal filings, above and beyond what would
be required for most private entities. 41  The accessibility of
35. Id. Notably, Alaska reported that twenty-nine percent of its cities
could not pay debts on time. Id.
36. Omer Kimhi, Reviving Cities: Legal Remedies to Municipal Financial
Crises, 88 B.U. L. REV. 633, 647 (2008) [hereinafter Reviving Cities].
37. Id.
38. Id. at 648.
39. Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code, supra note 31, at 372. By contrast,
once a municipality has entered bankruptcy, a court cannot compel it to
increase tax rates. Id.
40. See Reviving Cities, supra note 36, at 650.
41. See McConnell & Picker, supra note 22, at 455. For example, to
qualify, municipalities must meet a threshold test for insolvency, a
requirement not imposed on private entities filing voluntary petitions. Id. at
455-56. Under the current insolvency test, a municipality must demonstrate
that it has insufficient cash flow to be able to pay debts as they become due,
and in contrast to private entity debtors, other assets and liabilities are not
considered in this calculation. Id. at 456. The result of applying this
stringent cash flow test is that a municipality will not qualify to file until it
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Chapter 9 is also limited by constitutional concerns, most
particularly the sovereignty reserved for the states under the
Tenth Amendment. 42 Thus, before a municipality may petition for
Chapter 9 bankruptcy, the state must expressly and directly
approve of the filing.43 Because the creditworthiness of other
municipalities and the state itself may be negatively impacted by
the bankruptcy filing of a single municipality, states have often
been reluctant to give the required approval, and the second
requirement can thus pose a significant impediment to municipal
filings. 44  Furthermore, a bankruptcy court's powers under
Chapter 9 are limited to either confirming or rejecting a debt
readjustment plan (without making modifications) because the
court may not interfere with the local political or governmental
affairs of the municipality. 45 Thus, because the court's powers are
limited in altering the plan, Chapter 9 bankruptcy offers
municipalities a mode of debt readjustment through which they
exhausts its borrowing power, and thus has assumed additional new debt.
Id.
42. See Christopher Smith, Comment, Provisions for Access to Chapter 9
Bankruptcy: Their Flaws and Inadequacy of Past Reforms, 14 BANKR. DEV. J.
497, 499-500 (1998). Federal bankruptcy courts have specifically cited state
sovereignty concerns with regard to municipal bankruptcy filings. See, e.g.,
In re City of Colo. Springs, Spring Creek Gen. Improvement Dist., 177 B.R.
684, 693-94 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1995) ("Chapter 9 places federal law in
juxtaposition to the rights of states to create and govern their own
subdivisions."); In re Addison Cmty. Hosp. Auth., 175 B.R. 646, 649 (Bankr.
E.D. Mich. 1994) ("A primary distinction between chapter 11 and chapter 9
proceedings is that in the latter, the law must be sensitive to the issue of the
sovereignty of the states.").
43. See Reviving Cities, supra note 36, at 650. This requirement is
premised on the Tenth Amendment's federalism principle that the federal
government may not interfere with a state's political subdivisions without the
state's consent. Nicholas McGrath & Ji Hun Kim, The Next Chapter for
Municipal Bankruptcy, AM. BANKR. INST. J., June 2010, at 14-15.
44. See McConnell & Picker, supra note 22, at 460; see also, David R.
Berman, Takeovers of Local Governments: An Overview and Evaluation of
State Policies, PUBLIUS, Summer 1995, at 55, 59 (noting that states have
generally been reluctant to allow municipalities to file for Chapter 9
bankruptcy, instead preferring that distressed municipalities utilize the
remedies authorized by state legislation); Smith, supra note 42, at 521
(pointing out that because the credit ratings of other municipalities within a
state are likely to be negatively affected by one municipality's filing, "one
municipality's mess can become another's very real problem.").
45. Reviving Cities, supra note 36, at 653.
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can "cram-down" unfavorable plans on reluctant creditors.4 6
Under this approach, creditors are the primary group to bear the
cost of municipal insolvency, while the city is afforded an
opportunity for a fresh, debt-free start.47 Finally, although the
threat of bankruptcy may provide local actors with greater
leverage in negotiations with creditors and unions, most
municipalities eschew Chapter 9 filings because of the long-term
damage that bankruptcy might cause to their credit ratings and
ability to borrow at a low cost.4 8 For these reasons, municipal
bankruptcy filings have been relatively uncommon. 49 Overall,
then, Chapter 9 bankruptcy provides an incomplete solution to the
problem of municipal insolvency. 50
46. Id. at 651-52.
47. See id. at 654.
48. See Berman, supra note 44, at 58-59; see also, Chapter 9 of the
Bankruptcy Code, supra note 31, at 383 (explaining that a municipality's
financial crisis, "although seemingly an isolated event, may be a sign that
more local crises will occur in the future," an issue encountered by Orange
County after it filed for bankruptcy protection in the early 1990s).
49. See Robert J. Landry III & Keren H. Deal, More Municipalities Likely
to Face Chapter 9: Is a Perfect Storm Brewing?, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Jul.-Aug.
2008, at 18, 18. Between 1938 and 2007, only 579 municipalities filed
bankruptcy petitions, representing a "drop in the bucket" of total filings. Id.
Moreover, the vast majority of municipal filings have been by "special-
purpose municipalities," those designated to provide a specific service (e.g.,
utility districts). See Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code, supra note 31, at 359
& nn.43-44. In fact, between 1976 and 2009, only forty general-purpose
municipalities (i.e., towns, townships, cities, etc.) filed for Chapter 9
bankruptcy, and among those, only thirty were approved. Id. at 359. Two
prominent municipal bankruptcy filings include that of Orange County,
California in the early 1990s, and more recently the City of Vallejo's filing.
See In re City of Vallejo, 403 B.R. 72, 74 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2009); In re County
of Orange, 183 B.R. 594, 596 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995).
50. Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code, supra note 31, at 353-54. Kimhi
argues that Chapter 9 "is not a sensible solution for urban economic crises,
and that municipal financial distress should be dealt with in other manners."
Id. In particular, Kimhi notes that while bankruptcy in a corporate context
may be justified under the contract theory (i.e., that bankruptcy law
eliminates the common pool problem, increasing the value obtained by
creditors because creditors are considered collectively and the ones to benefit
are not necessarily the first to the courthouse steps), or the fresh start theory
(i.e., that giving an entity a fresh start, free from debt, will spark economic
activity, thus leading to financial recovery), neither theory justifies municipal
bankruptcy because there is no common pool problem in the municipal
context and the underlying causes of a municipality's financial distress are
unlikely to be eliminated along with its debts. Id. at 370-72.
PRESERVING LOCAL AUTONOMY
State financial oversight boards offer a third avenue for
resolution of municipal debt crises. 51 Financial oversight boards
originated before Congress passed municipal bankruptcy
provisions, and are creatures of statute, vested with the power to
restructure a municipality's debt and balance its budget. 52
Research indicates that since the 1970s, state oversight boards
have been utilized in at least fifty instances to resolve local fiscal
distress.53 State financial oversight boards operate in one of two
ways: in some instances state legislatures authorize oversight
boards in response to a specific crisis (a reactive approach), while
in other states, oversight boards assume a long-term monitoring
role, continuously assessing the fiscal health of localities and
intervening upon early indicators of distress (a proactive
approach). 54 Most often, however, the decision to create such a
board is an ad hoc one, made after one or more municipalities
have reached a crisis point. 55 The use of financial oversight
boards gives a city continued access to credit markets throughout
the reformation process, and once the municipality's financial
condition has sufficiently improved, the board typically dissolves
and control returns to the regular governing entities. 56  As
discussed in detail below (see infra Part II), Rhode Island law has
long provided for state intervention into municipal financial crises
via financial oversight boards, although as the Central Falls
experience demonstrates, the existence of such a remedy has not
always prompted its proactive use. 57
51. Reviving Cities, supra note 36, at 654. Kimhi notes the dearth of
academic or legal research and commentary on the role of financial oversight
boards in resolving municipal insolvency, despite their apparent benefits. Id.
at 636 & n.5.
52. Note, Missed Opportunity: Urban Fiscal Crises and Financial Control
Boards, 110 HARV. L. REv. 733, 735-38 (1997) [hereinafter Missed
Opportunity].
53. See Berman, supra note 44, at 56. State intervention mechanisms
have been utilized since the Great Depression, but New York City's 1975
financial crisis ushered in a modern era of state oversight. Id. at 60.
54. See Berman, supra note 44, at 57.
55. Reviving Cities, supra note 36, at 654. Often, states wait to intervene
until a municipality's bond credit rating is downgraded significantly or it is
unable to meet current operating expenses. Id.
56. See Reviving Cities, supra note 36, at 654.
57. See R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 45-9-3(a)(1) (1956), amended by R.I. GEN. LAWS
§§ 45-9-1 to -17 (2010); Marran v. Baird, 635 A.2d 1174, 1176 (R.I. 1994); City
in Receivership, supra note 1.
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C. Causes of Municipal Financial Distress and the Strengths of
Various Remedies
Within the corporate context, insolvency is generally caused
by either economic or financial distress.5 8 When a corporation's
operating expenses are consistently higher than its revenues,
economic distress occurs. 59 By contrast, financial distress occurs
as a result of a short-term inability to pay back debts, despite
operating revenues. 60  When a corporation is economically
distressed, eliminating its debt through bankruptcy is unlikely to
produce long-term recovery because its business model is not itself
sustainable; however, when a corporation is financially distressed,
eliminating burdensome debt obligations may allow the
corporation a fresh start to begin to function profitably. 61 Thus, in
the corporate context, bankruptcy law protects financially
distressed corporations by eliminating their onerous debt and
allowing for the continued functioning of economically viable
entities, while economically distressed corporations are allowed to
fall by the wayside.62 In the corporate context, the distinction
between economic and financial distress ellucidates the situations
in which bankruptcy will operate as an effective restructuring
tool.
There are two primary theories as to what causes municipal
financial distress.63  The first theory attributes municipal
financial distress to extrinsic socioeconomic factors such as
suburbanization, trends in the national economy, and larger
taxing and spending policies.64 For example, some researchers
58. Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code, supra note 31, at 374.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 375. Obviously, in the municipal context, allowing an
economically distressed town or city to cease to exist would be an incomplete
solution. Id.
63. Anthony G. Cahill & Joseph A. James, Responding to Municipal
Fiscal Distress: An Emerging Issue for State Governments in the 1990s, 52
PUB. ADMIN. REV. 88, 92-93 (1992); see also Reviving Cities, supra note 36, at
638.
64. Reviving Cities, supra note 36, at 638-42. For example, unfunded
mandates imposed by state governments can contribute significantly to a
municipality's financial distress by creating additional costs and reducing the
municipality's flexibility in making budgetary decisions. Chapter 9 of the
Bankruptcy Code, supra note 31, at 377-78.
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argue that a city's financial health depends on factors like
"national business cycles, suburbanization and decline in local
business activity, and state and federal policies towards local
governments."65  In such contexts, restructuring, either via
bankruptcy or state intervention is unlikely to resolve the long-
term issues because ultimately, the cost of services that the
municipality must provide to residents is simply too great to be
satisfied through tax and other revenue. 66 This theory on the
factors underlying municipal insolvency is similar to the economic
distress theory in the corporate context.
Conversely, the second approach attributes financial distress
to political influences and mismanagement by local officials as the
root causes of the problem. While theorists subscribing to this
approach do not entirely discount the role of socioeconomic factors,
they argue that "the city's political system is the ultimate
determinant of whether the city will deteriorate into a crisis or
will remain in relatively good fiscal health."67 For example,
advocates of this theory sometimes point to poor or manipulative
accounting practices by municipal managers as the ultimate cause
of financial collapse.68  Others stress the role of political
influences on elected officials, who are essentially held hostage by
fragmented political interests groups. 69 Under this view, theorists
emphasize the disproportionate influence over municipal spending
by small, specialized interest groups, who are able to utilize their
political power to externalize the costs of their pet projects onto
other taxpayers. 70 Because these small but powerful political
65. Reviving Cities, supra note 36, at 639.
66. Cahill & James, supra note 63, at 93. Some suggest that in such
situations, the best solution is to annex the ailing municipality onto an
economically stronger neighboring community. Id. However, this still does
not alleviate existing contract and debt obligations or reduce the overall cost
of services required for that community of residents. Id. Thus, annexation is
likely to merely shift the problem, rather than resolving it. Id.
67. Reviving Cities, supra note 36, at 642.
68. See id. This theory seems to underlie the Orange County bankruptcy
filing in 1994, where the municipality faced "acute and immediate" financial
crisis after risky investments made by the municipality's finance director
failed to pan out and the municipality lost an estimated $527 million. See In
re County of Orange, 179 B.R. 177, 179 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995); Landry &
Deal, supra note 49, at 70.
69. Reviving Cities, supra note 36, at 643-44.
70. See id. at 644-45. Kimhi uses public swimming pools as an apt
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interest groups are able to exert disproportionate influence over
the budget process, local officials who are looking primarily to the
next election cycle, rather than long-term sustainability, will be
less likely to develop budget policies on the basis of informed
economic judgment than they will be to respond to the immediate
demands of those key constituents who exert substantial control
over their political fates. 71 For example, research indicates that
municipalities that file for Chapter 9 bankruptcy often return to
insolvency within a few years because the core problems created
by fragmented special interests are not addressed by the
bankruptcy remedy, and thus, long-term financial recovery is not
achieved. 72
The ideal response to municipal financial crises may well
depend on which of these theories operates in the case at hand. If
the underlying cause of financial distress relates to socioeconomic
patterns or external policies, then it may be unnecessary to
remove the influence of politics in an effort to reform the budget.
However, to the extent that political influences pervade the
example of how such specialized interest groups achieve their intended policy
outcomes while externalizing costs:
Usually, the costs of construction are taken from the public budget,
but the pool will be used only by a specific segment of the
community, i.e., those who like swimming and live relatively close to
the pool. Nearby swimmers, therefore, have an incentive to pressure
politicians to build a larger, more expensive pool. The swimmers
will enjoy the pool's benefits, while the costs will be shared with the
entire community.
Id. at 645.
71. See generally ESTER R. FUCHS, MAYORS AND MONEY: FISCAL POLICY IN
NEW YORK AND CHICAGO 5-7, 242-61 (1992). Fuchs points to the power of
fragmented political influences as the primary reason why New York
experienced severe financial crises during the 1970s, while Chicago, another
large city experiencing similar socioeconomic changes, did not. Id. at 5-7.
Whereas the political scene in Chicago at that time was dominated by a
strong political machine that could easily resist the political pressures of
fragmented special interest groups, New York, on the other hand was not
controlled by any single group, making it an ideal stage for political battles
for control over the budget. Id.
72. Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code, supra note 31, at 381. Although
the restructuring benefit offered by Chapter 9 may help municipalities facing
short-term and unexpected financial crises (e.g., rebuilding after a natural
disaster or paying a large judgment in a lawsuit), when a city or town's
financial distress is the result of long-term economic problems, bankruptcy
reorganization offers little long-term assistance. Id. at 382.
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budgetary process, removing some of the political pressure may be
absolutely essential to developing and implementing the necessary
changes to economic policy. 73 In fact, unelected and politically
unaccountable fiscal control boards may well be able to accomplish
the budgetary overhaul necessary for long-term recovery precisely
because they are not hindered by local political pressures.7 4 For
example, when Chelsea, Massachusetts entered state authorized
receivership in 1991, the receiver was able to negotiate a new
contract with the firefighters' union that was favorable for the
city, but unpopular with influential groups, "because the receiver
did not have to run for re-election and face the wrath of organized,
focused opposition."7 5
Each of the three responses to municipal insolvency discussed
above removes the influences of special political influences to some
extent, and at the same time divests local residents of a
democratic voice in the process. For example, in the context of
traditional creditors remedies and bankruptcy, the authority of
local officials over fiscal matters is substantially circumscribed, as
the courts step in and play a significant role reshaping the
municipality's obligations. Financial reform boards offer an
opportunity to eliminate the destructive influences of political
fragmentation, while still preserving some vestiges of democratic
control over the reform process, and thus are the best option from
the perspective of representational democracy. 76 Although fiscal
crisis typically requires a rapid damage control response, 7 7 the
73. See Missed Opportunity, supra note 52, at 746-47. Some research
indicates that centralizing budgetary authority in a single individual
diminishes the role of special interest influences and the political
fragmentation that can drive up deficits. See Reviving Cities, supra note 36,
at 669.
74. Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code, supra note 31, at 388-89.
75. Ed Cyr, Thoughts on the Chelsea Receivership, GOV'T FIN. REV., Aug.
1993, at 23, 23.
76. See Missed Opportunity, supra note 52, at 734-35. This Note
observes that as implemented in many U.S. jurisdictions, financial control
boards deprive local residents of an appropriate role in the reform process
despite the opportunity to integrate local input. See id.
77. For example, after New York City's financial crisis reached a fever
pitch, "[local control was largely suspended during the 'crisis regime"' as
power over financial matters was vested in a small group of state appointees.
Berman, supra note 44, at 60. Locally elected officials were largely frustrated
in their efforts to influence the budgetary process for roughly a decade. Id.
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immediate need for centralized control at the outset does not
preclude the possibility of local input in later stages.78  For
example, there is an immediate need in the face of such a crisis to
stabilize a community's finances, giving reassurances to the
municipality's creditors, as well as to credit rating agencies
generally, so that the municipality can once again gain access to
capital markets. 79 However, once the initial stabilization has
been accomplished, an opportunity opens to integrate resident
stakeholders into the reform process, and, in fact, such a "full-
blown fiscal crisis . . . can present voters with an incentive to
participate meaningfully in decisionmaking that directly affects
their quality of life."8 0
Unfortunately, the typical implementation of financial control
boards does not create opportunities for participation by the
electorate, instead vesting control throughout the reform period in
a politically unaccountable body, whose responsibility it is to
resolve both the short and long-term crises.8 1 While this approach
eliminates the pressures that fragmented and self-interested local
factions exert under normal circumstances (those that may well
have contributed to the fiscal crisis in the first place), excluding
citizen participation beyond the initial damage control phase is
neither necessary nor desirable.8 2 In fact, to the extent that
continued monopolization of control over the budget reform
process divests voter-residents of the chance to participate, this
strategy robs them of a unique opportunity to gain "a
sophisticated understanding of their role in the crisis and in
potential future crises." 8 3 Thus, by excluding voter-residents from
the reform process, but later returning control to those who were
in control pre-crisis, a state takeover fails as a teachable moment,
entrenches the same local officials who were in power leading up
to the financial collapse, and "undermines the significance of
participatory decision-making as a democratic ideal."84  It
appears, therefore, that utilizing a participatory process to resolve
78. See Missed Opportunity, supra note 52, at 746.
79. See id. at 739.
80. See id. at 745.
81. See id. at 746-47.
82. See id. at 746-47.
83. See id. at 747.
84. See id.
PRESERVING LOCAL AUTONOMY
fiscal crisis not only creates an opportunity for the democratic
input that we value as a society, but also serves to increase the
likelihood of long term economic reform in economically stressed
cities and towns.8 5
D. Preserving Local Control over Matters of Local Concern: The
Home Rule Movement and Assurances of Democratic Control at
the Local Level
Traditionally, American cities and towns have been thought
to be creatures of the state.8 6 This idea is perhaps best captured
by Dillon's Rule as articulated by Iowa Supreme Court Justice and
legal scholar, John Dillon:
It is a general and undisputed proposition of law that a
municipal corporation possesses, and can exercise, the
following powers and no others: First, those granted in
express words; second, those necessarily or fairly implied
in, or incident to, the powers expressly granted; third,
those essential to the declared objects and purposes of the
corporation - not simply convenient, but indispensable.
Any fair, reasonable doubt concerning the existence of a
power is resolved by the courts against the corporation,
and the power is denied.8 7
Inherent in this conception of municipal authority was the idea
85. See id. at 749. In an ideal fiscal reform process, "exposure to the
fiscal issues facing the city through participation in the [financial reform
board] process would enable citizens to begin developing the requisite
knowledge to engage meaningfully in the political process in the future when
fiscal matters are at issue." Id.
86. For example, in Trenton v. New Jersey, the Supreme Court described
the relative allocation of power between the state and municipalities, noting
that:
The city is a political subdivision of the state, created as a
convenient agency for the exercise of such of the governmental
powers of the state as may be intrusted to it .... In the absence of
state constitutional provisions safeguarding it to them,
municipalities have no inherent right of self-government which is
beyond the legislative control of the state . . . . the state may
withhold, grant, or withdraw powers and privileges as it sees fit.
262 U.S. 182, 185-86, 187 (1923).
87. JOHN F. DILLON, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §
55 (1872); see also Merriam v. Moody's Ex'rs, 25 Iowa 163, 170 (1868).
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that cities and towns received limited grant of power from the
state government, and that ultimately, the source of sovereignty
over local matters rested with state, not the local government. 88
As such, under Dillon's Rule, a municipality's reservoir of power
was confined to express or implied grants of authority from the
state to regulate in areas where local-decision making was
"indispensible," or the state had explicitly conferred a portion of
its own plenary power on the lesser municipal government.8 9 In
effect, Dillon's Rule was a rule of statutory construction, which
provided that "statutory grants of authority should be narrowly
construed: if the grant contains an ambiguity, that ambiguity
should be resolved against a finding of local government
lawmaking authority."90 Thus, Dillon's Rule tended to reduce the
amount of control that municipal officials could exercise over local
affairs.91
Although Dillon's Rule had been accepted by most
jurisdictions by the end of the nineteenth century, local politicians
and municipal residents viewed the premise with suspicion as it
allowed distant state legislatures to meddle in local affairs.92
After all, the Greek and Roman traditions, after which much of
American government was modeled, preserved elements of local
autonomy, and even the English Parliament had guaranteed
certain liberties to localities. 93 Thomas Jefferson himself had
envisioned four hubs of republican government: the federal
government to address foreign and federal issues, the state
governments to legislate on matters of state concern, county
governments to deal with county-wide issues, and finally, ward
governments to address matters of neighborhood concern.94
In the early twentieth century, the Home Rule Movement was
88. See Gary T. Schwartz, Reviewing and Revising Dillon's Rule, 67 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 1025, 1025 (1991).
89. See Terrence P. Haas, Note, Constitutional Home Rule in Rhode
Island, 11 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 677, 680 (2006).
90. See Schwartz, supra note 88, at 1025.
91. Id. at 1025.
92. See Haas, supra note 89, at 680-81.
93. U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, LOCAL
GOVERNMENT AUTONOMY: NEEDS FOR STATE CONSTITUTIONAL STATUTORY, AND
JUDICIAL CLARIFICATION 25-27 (Oct. 1993), available at http://digital.library.
unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadcl427/ [hereinafter U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N].
94. Id. at 30.
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born, finding its initial support among those local politicians and
residents who sought to codify protection against the caprice of
state legislators through Home Rule charters. 95 Under Home
Rule, municipalities received direct grants of authority in state
constitutions, typically over local or municipal affairs, and these
grants of authority effectively superseded Dillon's Rule by vesting
municipalities with their own identity and sphere of control,
independent of the state.9 6 Home Rule is premised on the same
basic principles that underlie federalism - the ideas that in some
areas, a smaller, more localized government will be better situated
to respond to local issues and that democratic input of the
populace in resolving local problems contributes a unique value. 9 7
As Barron points out:
The invocation of "local autonomy" conjures up the
attractive values associated with protecting localized
decisionmaking: promoting responsive and participatory
government by bringing the government closer to the
people; fostering diversity and experimentation by
increasing the fora for expressing policy choices and
creating a competition for a mobile citizenry; and
providing a check against tyranny by diffusing power that
would otherwise be concentrated. 98
Thus, a municipality's right to Home Rule reflects not only a
policy choice about the division of political power, but also the core
values of our system of government that democracy can and
should exist even at the most local level.
Home Rule provisions may serve dual functions: first, they
may restrict the authority of state legislatures to pass laws
regulating the form of municipal government (immunity
provisions); second, they may confer upon municipalities the
power to regulate a circumscribed set of matters without prior
state authorization (initiative provisions).99  Most commonly,
95. See Schwartz, supra note 88, at 1025-26.
96. Id. at 1026.
97. David J. Barron, Commentary, A Localist Critique of the New
Federalism, 51 DUKE L.J. 377, 377-78 (2001).
98. Id.
99. See Haas, supra note 89, at 682; Barron, supra note 97, at 392; U.S.
ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 93, at 7.
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Home Rule provisions confer "grants of initiative," allowing
localities to create and implement policies on local issues, but not
necessarily limiting state intervention into local affairs.OO Many
state constitutions, including Rhode Island's, contain a "ripper
clause," which creates a negative local liberty by limiting the
ability of the state to legislate on local structural issues (e.g., the
form of local government) without approval by the local
electorate.101 Home Rule provisions protect resident input at the
local level by limiting the ability of the state government to dictate
the form of local government and preventing state legislatures
from dominating the minutia of day-to-day municipal activity.102
Therefore, Home Rule provisions enhance democratic functioning
at the local level by ensuring that particular classes of locally
enacted policies are afforded protection from state interference,
while also conferring upon local governments a degree of
legitimacy, vis-a-vis resident voters, and autonomy, vis-a-vis the
state.
The tension between Home Rule on the one hand and Dillon's
Rule on the other becomes apparent when considering solutions to
inter-municipal problems. For example, trends like
suburbanization and fluctuations in state and federal aid to
municipalities tend not to exist in the vacuum of a single locality,
so solutions to the problems caused by such inter-municipality
trends often require an inter-municipal response. 10 3
Furthermore, if towns and cities were completely free to craft and
implement whatever policies best suited their residents,
municipalities would likely externalize the costs of such policies,
forcing their neighbors - equally autonomous localities - to bear
the expenses.104 Thus, in some situations, centralized decision
100. U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 93, at iii.
101. Id. at 12.
102. See Haas, supra note 89, at 682-83.
103. See Barron, supra note 97, at 378-79. Barron posits that "[t]he ability
of each locality to make effective decisions on its own is inevitably shaped by
its relation to other cities and states, by its relations to broader, private
market forces, and, most importantly, by the way the central power
structures these relations, even when central governmental power appears to
be dormant." Id.
104. Id. at 385-86. Take, for example, air quality regulations: a locality
that establishes lax air pollution standards for its residents may
detrimentally affect air quality in neighboring municipalities, but those
neighboring municipalities will be largely unable to mitigate the spread of
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making may actually enhance local autonomy by limiting the
ability of municipalities to implement policies that produce
negative externalities for their neighbors. 10 5
E. Rhode Island's Home Rule Tradition
Rhode Island's Home Rule history is particularly interesting
because during much of the colonial era, Rhode Island was better
categorized as a collection of cities and towns than as a unified
colony.106 Even after Rhode Island received a charter from the
throne in 1644, the centralized government was weak against the
entrenched and independent settlements that predated the
colony's official existence.10 7 Eventually, a second charter was
granted, authorizing a stronger centralized government, but it
was several years before the General Assembly could wrest control
from the politically powerful settlement communities because any
shifts in control to the centralized colonial government were
largely dependent on the consent of the decentralized
communities.108 Even after the American Revolution, Rhode
Island continued to operate under its colonial charter, and it was
not until 1842 that the state adopted a constitution.1 0 9 Despite
the early colonial tradition of strong, local self-government, by the
early twentieth century it was clear that the primary reservoir of
the pollution. Id. Without some centralized air pollution policy that
constrains actors in all localities, the ability of the surrounding
municipalities to control their own air quality is limited. Id. In such
situations, therefore, a centralized policy that sets upper limits for local
autonomy actually enhances the autonomy of localities on the whole. Id. at
386.
105. Id. at 386-87.
106. See SYDNEY V. JAMES, COLONIAL RHODE ISLAND: A HISTORY 1 (1975).
In fact, Rhode Island began as four colonial settlements that eventually
united under a colonial charter in 1647, but "[tihe form of government
adopted under that charter was a federation of towns, rather than a colony.
Legislation originated in the towns, and the general assembly had simply a
power of approval or veto. Local self-government was preserved to its full
extent." City of Newport v. Horton, 47 A. 312, 313 (R.I. 1900).
107. Haas, supra note 89, at 687; see also City of Newport, 47 A. at 313.
108. Haas, supra note 89, at 688. Historical accounts describe this slow
shift in control, noting that even as the General Assembly consolidated its
own power, it engaged in the practice of granting town charters, which town
leaders argued provided legal protection for particular aspects of local
autonomy. Id. at 689.
109. Id. at 690.
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power in Rhode Island rested with the General Assembly, and not
the individual cities and towns.110 Early Rhode Island Supreme
Court decisions reflect the view that local communities lacked
innate authority over local matters, and instead that the General
Assembly was permitted to legislate on local matters.111
By 1951, sufficient political support in favor of a Home Rule
provision had accumulated, and the General Assembly adopted a
Home Rule Amendment put forth at that year's limited
constitutional convention.11 2  The stated purpose of the
amendment was to "grant and confirm to the people to the people
of every city and town in this state the right of self government in
all local matters."11 3 The Amendment set specific limits on the
power of the General Assembly to legislate on local matters:
§ 4. Powers of the general assembly over cities and towns:
The general assembly shall have the power to act in
relation to the property, affairs and government of any
city or town by general laws which shall apply alike to all
cities and towns, but which shall not affect the form of
government of any city or town. The general assembly
shall also have the power to act in relation to the property,
affairs and government of a particular city or town
provided that such legislative action shall become effective
only upon approval by a majority of the qualified electors
of the said city or town voting at a general or special
110. See id. at 691-92.
111. See, e.g., City of Providence v. Moulton, 160 A. 75, 75-76, 78 (R.I.
1932) (affirming state legislation that replaced locally appointed officials with
a "Board of Public Safety," members of which were appointed by the
governor, citing Dillon's Rule to support the conclusion that Rhode Island
"cifies and towns have no inherent right of local government"); City of
Newport, 47 A. at 314, 316 (holding that while "[t]owns and cities are
recognized in the constitution, and doubtless they have rights which cannot
be infringed," Newport lacked the inherent right to completely control its
police force, and the state legislature did not exceed its authority in
establishing a board of police commissioners for the city).
112. R.I. CONST. art. XIII; Haas, supra note 89, at 692-93 (noting that the
amendment passed the General Assembly unanimously with 170 votes in
favor). Although the Home Rule Amendment was initially added to the state
constitution as Article XXVIII, at the 1986 Rhode Island limited
constitutional convention, the provision was moved to Article XIII. In re
Advisory Op. to the House of Representatives, 628 A.2d 537, 538 (R.I. 1993).
113. R.I. CONST. art. XIII, § 1.
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election, except that in the case of acts involving the
imposition of a tax or the expenditure of money by a town
the same shall provide for the submission thereof to those
electors in said town qualified to vote upon a proposition
to impose a tax or for the expenditure of money."l 4
Thus, the Rhode Island Home Rule Amendment established an
element of local democratic control, to be protected from certain
state encroachments, by requiring changes that would affect the
form of local government be approved by a majority of the
municipality's voters before becoming effective.11 5 Furthermore,
the Amendment provides that "every city and town shall have a
legislative body composed of one or two branches elected by vote of
its qualified electors," indicating that the Amendment was
intended to protect not just local government, but a democratically
elected local republican government."l 6
Rhode Island's high court has addressed the Home Rule
Amendment several times since its initial passage in 1951. These
opinions fall into three general categories: advisory opinions
issued per the request of the legislature, clarifying the
applicability of the Amendment in particular factual contexts;117
challenges initiated by municipalities or their representatives,
114. Id. § 4 (emphasis added).
115. See id. However, to the extent that the General Assembly's
legislation does not violate this or other constitutional provisions, it is
supreme and thus preempts conflicting local ordinances. R.I. CONST. art. VI,
§1.
116. See R.I. CONST. art. XIII, § 3.
117. See, e.g., In re Advisory Op. to the House of Representatives, 628 A.2d
at 539 (advising the state legislature that reapportionment of voting districts
is among the powers reserved for a municipality under the Home Rule
Amendment, and any state level approval of a reapportionment plan would
trigger the voter ratification requirement described in section four of Article
XIII because state approval would constitute state action affecting the form of
local government); Op. to the House of Representatives, 96 A.2d 627, 630-31
(R.I. 1953) (concluding that the power to establish policies and procedures
related to general municipal elections was retained by the General Assembly,
and was not transferred to the municipalities via the Home Rule
Amendment); Op. to the House of Representatives, 87 A.2d 693, 696 (R.I.
1952) (concluding that among several hypothetical scenarios posited by the
General Assembly relating to state legislation that would affect local
elections, only the imposition of term limits for municipal officials by the
state legislature would constitute a regulation of the "form" of local
government).
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claiming that state legislation encroaches upon municipal
legislative authority; 18 and cases challenging municipal policies
and regulations on the grounds that they are preempted by state
law. 119 Taken collectively, these decisions set forth several clear
guidelines for determining the applicability of the Home Rule
Amendment in any particular situation.
The first advisory opinion issued by the Rhode Island
Supreme Court to the legislature following enactment of the Home
Rule Amendment distinguished between the rights of those towns
and cities that have passed a Home Rule charter, and those that
have not, indicating that a validly enacted and approved charter is
118. See, e.g., Marran v. Baird, 635 A.2d 1174, 1176, 1178-79 (R.I. 1994)
(holding that the establishment of a budget commission with the power to
impose taxes and make appropriations on behalf of a financially distressed
municipality pursuant to state law did not violate Article XIII because the
effect on local government was only "incidental and temporary," the
legislation affected all cities and towns equally, and the provision addressed a
matter of statewide concern); Town of East Greenwich v. O'Neil, 617 A.2d
104, 110-12 (R.I. 1992) (holding that the location of high-voltage power lines
was a matter of statewide concern, and thus could be regulated by the state
legislature notwithstanding local ordinances purporting to do the same);
McCarthy v. Johnson, 574 A.2d 1229, 1230-32 (R.I. 1990) (holding that state
legislation extending the period for giving notice of a tort claim against the
City of Newport was invalid under Article XIII because it applied only to the
City of Newport, not to all Rhode Island cities and towns generally, and it did
not address a matter of statewide concern); Bruckshaw v. Paolino, 557 A.2d
1221, 1223-24 (R.I. 1989) (holding that Providence's pension plan for
municipal employees was not a matter of statewide concern, such that the
General Assembly's attempt to implement a competing plan for Providence
employees encroached upon the city's home rule authority under Article XIII,
and rendered the state legislation "invalid and unenforceable"); City of
Cranston v. Hall, 354 A.2d 415, 417 (R.I. 1976) (holding that because the
state-authorized Fire Fighters Act applied equally to all towns and cities, it
did not violate Article XIII, and the state legislation therefore preempted
local ordinances regulating the same activity).
119. See, e.g., O'Neill v. City of East Providence, 480 A.2d 1375, 1379-80
(R.I. 1984) (holding that where municipal and state procedures on
condemnation were inconsistent, city officials were correct in following the
state procedure because municipal laws that conflict with validly enacted
state legislation are preempted); Marro v. Gen. Treasurer of the City of
Cranston, 273 A.2d 660, 662-63 (R.I. 1971) (holding that actions taken by the
mayor and city council to force a disabled police officer into retirement were
invalid where a state statute purported to regulate the right of a disabled
officer to receive a pension, reasoning that although cities and towns have the
power to legislate on local matters under the Home Rule Amendment, local
regulations that conflict with valid state legislation are preempted).
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a necessary precursor for Home Rule protections.1 20 Additionally,
the Court made clear that when legislating on matters of local
concern, the General Assembly may enact general measures that
affect all cities and towns equally, but legislation directed at a
particular city or town must be approved by a majority or
resident-voters.121 The Court also indicated that the only
absolute restraint created by the Home Rule Amendment on the
General Assembly's power is the prohibition against legislation
that alters the form of government in a chartered town or city.12 2
In an advisory opinion issued the following year, the Court
read the powers conferred to municipalities narrowly, concluding
that "all matters pertaining to the conduct of municipal general
elections . . . are exclusively within the province of the general
assembly and are subject to existing general laws."'12 3 In reaching
this conclusion, the Court emphasized the "long history of the
general assembly's exclusive authority over the conduct of
elections," and reasoned that had the framers of the Home Rule
Amendment intended to vest authority to determine how
municipal elections would be conducted with the municipalities
themselves, they would have been more explicit in so doing.124
Thus, matters of local concern that the General Assembly have
historically regulated are less likely to qualify for Home Rule
protection.
Although early cases reflected a narrow reading of the Home
Rule Amendment,125 the Court later broadened its reading of the
120. See Op. to the House of Representatives, 87 A.2d at 695-96. The Home
Rule Amendment contains several provisions relating to the adoption and
approval of town and city charters. See R.I. CONST. art. XIII, §§ 6-10.
121. Op. to the House of Representatives, 87 A.2d at 696.
122. Id.
123. Op. to the House of Representatives, 96 A.2d at 631.
124. Id. at 630-31.
125. See, e.g., Newport Amusement Co. v. Maher, 166 A.2d 216, 218-19
(R.I 1960). In this early case, the Court invalidated a local ordinance
requiring business with jukeboxes to obtain a city permit, reasoning that
absent an express grant of power from the General Assembly, municipalities
could not regulate in an area, refusing to recognize the Amendment as a
"grant of plenary power to enact licensing laws without regard to the will of
the legislature .... ." Id. at 219. As Haas points out, "[t]he court here
appeared not to consider the possibility that the Home Rule Amendment was
in fact intended to confer upon municipalities a certain limited ability to
enact regulations not inconsistent with those enacted by the General
Assembly." Haas, supra note 89, at 700.
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provision, invalidating a handful of state laws that impermissibly
impinged upon local autonomy. For example, in Bruckshaw v.
Paolino, a 1989 case, the Court invalidated a state law purporting
to establish a retirement system for Providence municipal
employees.126 After Providence refused to implement one of the
act's provisions, an affected employee filed suit seeking
declaratory relief.127  Holding that the state legislation
encroached upon local decisional authority under the Home Rule
Amendment, the Court set forth several guidelines for
determining the situations in which the General Assembly has
trespassed upon the decisional authority of local officials: a state
provision will be "invalid and unenforceable" when (1) the town or
city has adopted a charter that vests it with the authority to
regulate the activity at issue, (2) the General Assembly has
ratified the charter, (3) the state provision at issue purports to
regulate a matter of local, as opposed to statewide concern, and (4)
the state provision was not promulgated pursuant to Article XIII's
requirement that local matters be affirmed by a majority vote of
the electorate.128
Only a year later, in McCarthy v. Johnson, the Court again
invalidated a state law on the grounds that it impermissibly
interfered with local authority as reserved by the Home Rule
Amendment.129 There, the plaintiff had failed to notify the City of
Newport of a personal injury claim within the sixty-day notice
period as provided by state law, and when the plaintiff eventually
filed her lawsuit, Newport asserted, as its defense, the plaintiffs
failure to give timely notification of the claim. 130 In response, the
General Assembly passed a special act allowing the plaintiff at bar
to give late notice in that case. 131 In striking down this special
exception, the Court noted that as in Bruckshaw, this statute
"directly affect[ed] a single community," and that as such, "it is a
matter of local concern and must be submitted to the voters of that
community at a general or special election" per the terms of the
126. 557 A.2d 1221, 1222-23(R.I. 1989).
127. Id. at 1222.
128. Id. at 1222, 1224.
129. See McCarthy v. Johnson, 574 A.2d 1229, 1229, 1231 (R.I. 1990).
130. Id. at 1229-30.
131. Id. at 1230.
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Home Rule Amendment. 13 2
The Court's decisions in Bruckshaw and McCarthy evince a
reading of the Home Rule Amendment that gives a high level of
deference to municipal autonomy against attempts by the state to
intervene into the local affairs of a particular community.
Similarly, in an advisory opinion to the House of Representatives
only three years later, the Court affirmed the authority of a
municipality to reapportion its voting districts under the Home
Rule Amendment without the approval of the General
Assembly.X33 In fact, noting that the "Legislature can act only in
relation to the property, affairs, and government of any home-rule
city or town by the General Laws when such legislation pertains
to all cities and towns alike and does not affect the form of
government of any home-rule city or town," the Court concluded
that any such approval or input by the General Assembly would
constitute state action affecting the form of local government, and
would require approval by a majority of the municipality's
voters.134 Taken together, this line of cases demonstrates a
departure from the Court's narrow construction of the Home Rule
Amendment that was typical in its earlier jurisprudence.135 In
fact, through these cases, the Court seems to have embraced the
underlying goals of the Home Rule Amendment: promoting local
control over local matters, but with a balance against the plenary
authority of the General Assembly to legislate on matters of
statewide concern. 136
132. Id. at 1231. The Court later set forth three criteria in ascertaining
whether a matter is of local as opposed to statewide concern: whether
uniform statewide regulations are necessary or desirable, whether the matter
has traditionally been left to the state or to localities to address, and whether
the matter will affect other communities. Town of East Greenwich v. O'Neil,
617 A.2d 104, 111(R.I. 1992).
133. In re Advisory Op. to the House of Representatives, 628 A.2d 537, 539
(R.I. 1993).
134. Id. at 538.
135. Haas, supra note 89, at 707.
136. Id. (positing that "[t]he result [from this line of cases] has not been a
complete destruction of the legislature's authority ... between the state and
home rule municipalities in a strictly limited number of areas."). In fact,
when local residents challenged a municipality's authority to expand its own
sewer system under under its Home Rule charter, the Court held that while
"[miunicipalities may not [ ] legislate on matters of statewide concern," "the
power over sewers and drains is not a matter of statewide concern since [the
town's] charter specifically provides for the department of public works to be
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Of particular importance in assessing the state's response to
Central Falls' financial crises was the Court's decision in Marran
v. Baird.137 There, the City of West Warwick was at risk of
defaulting on its bond obligations and its bond credit rating had
been downgraded to junk bond status, triggering the formation of
a budget commission under the precursor statute to the current
municipal insolvency legislation.138 The plaintiffs in that case
challenged the validity of the budget commission that was
constituted to balance the city's budget, arguing that because the
legislation that authorized the budget commission would affect
every municipality differently, it did not apply "alike" to all cities
and towns as required by the Home Rule Amendment. 139
Furthermore, the plaintiffs argued that because the imposition of
a budget commission would alter the form of municipal
government, voter approval was required before the change could
take legal effect.140
The Court rejected both arguments, finding that because the
statute allowed for the appointment of a budget commission 'in
any town or city"' upon specified triggering events, while the
statute affected each town and city differently, it applied equally
to all.141 Moreover, the Court noted that because "[t]he fiscal
collapse of a municipality can affect the entire state's financial
interests," the General Assembly has traditionally played an
active role in "ensuring financial stability [of cities and towns]
notwithstanding the provisions of the home-rule charters."142 As
to the plaintiffs' argument that the statute impermissibly altered
the form of local government, the Court held that because the
commission's role would last only through the remainder of the
responsible for sewers and drains." Westerly Residents for Thoughtful Dev.,
Inc. v. Brancato, 565 A.2d 1262, 1262, 1264 (R.I 1989).
137. 635 A.2d 1174 (R.I. 1994).
138. Marran v. Baird, 635 A.2d 1174, 1176 (R.I. 1994). As described
further below, at that time, the formation of a budget commission was the
only mechanism through which a state could intervene in a municipal
financial crisis. See R.I. GEN. LAWs § 45-9-3(a)(1) (1956), amended by R.I.
GEN. LAws §§ 45-9-1 to -17 (2010).
139. Marran, 625 A.2d at 1177.
140. Id.
141. Id. (quoting R.I. GEN. LAws § 45-9-3, amended by R.I. GEN. LAwS § 45-
9-1 to -17 (2010)).
142. Id. at 1178-79.
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fiscal year, the statute's "effect on the structure of West Warwick's
government [wa]s at most incidental and temporary," and "[t]he
provision d[id] not, therefore, affect the form of government of any
city or town and consequently d[id] not violate article 13."143
Thus, while the Court had previously recognized and protected the
ability of municipalities to legislate on matters of local concern, it
drew a line here, allowing for state intervention when a
municipality's financial condition posed a risk to other
communities. The Court's "temporary and incidental" qualifier
thus allows for direct state intervention into the form of a
municipality's government so long as the alteration is not
permanent or sweeping, evincing a less deferential interpretation
of the Home Rule Amendment under which even the form of local
government is not sacred when the matter at hand threatens
other Rhode Island communities.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Rhode Island's Financial Oversight Statute
In 1993, Rhode Island implemented a state-level financial
oversight provision whereby upon certain triggering events, the
state's director of revenue would become empowered to intervene
and establish a budget commission. 144 Under this statute, the
director of revenue had the authority to unilaterally establish a
budget review commission upon a finding that the municipality's
bond credit rating had been downgraded to below investment
grade and "there [wa]s an imminent threat of default on an one or
all of its debt obligations."'145 Budget commissions were to be
composed of a mix of state representatives and local stakeholders
including the municipality's chief executive officer, the president
of its town or city council, three residents of the municipality, and
two ex-officio state officials. 146 Review boards were empowered to
impose taxes, make appropriations, adopt a budget, and reduce or
143. Id. at 1178.
144. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-9-3(a)(1) (1956), amended by R.I. GEN. LAWS §§
45-9-1 to -17 (2010).
145. Id.
146. Id. § 45-9-3(a)(2). One of the ex-official state officials would be a
designee and representative of the director of revenue, and the other a
gubernatorial appointee, with the advice and consent of the state Senate. Id.
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suspend appropriations to specific departments.147 Boards could
act upon a simple majority, so long as a quorum of four was
achieved.148 The structure of the budget review commission
under the 1993 legislation preserved an important element of local
control by setting a high threshold for state intervention,
integrating both local officials and municipal residents, and
allowing for majority control by a body that was primarily
comprised of local, as opposed to state, stakeholders. Although
the Court did not specifically mention the high level of local
participation on the budget review commission in its decision in
Marran, the fact that the commission was controlled by local
stakeholders may have contributed to the Court's determination
that the statute's impact on the form of local government was only
"incidental."149
Despite signs of financial distress in Central Falls leading up
to its judicial receivership petition, the budget commission statute
was not triggered because Central Falls' bond credit rating was
not downgraded to below investment grade until after the
municipality filed for receivership.150  At that point, the
perception among state officials was that stronger medicine was
needed.151 The General Assembly rushed into action, hastily
passing a bill that would alter the existing budget commission
provision and incorporate additional mechanisms for state
oversight of municipal finances.152
This sweeping new legislation is intended to "provide a
mechanism for the state to work with cities and towns undergoing
financial distress that threatens the fiscal well-being, public safety
and welfare of such cities and towns, or other cities and towns or
the state."153 Furthermore, the authority conferred by the
legislation is to be utilized "in such a manner as will best preserve
the safety and welfare of citizens of the state and their property,
and the access of the state and its municipalities to capital
147. Id. § 45-9-3(a)(9).
148. Id. § 45-9-3(a)(6).
149. See Marran v. Baird, 635 A.2d 1174, 1178 (R.I. 1994).
150. City in Receivership, supra note 1; Ratings agency, supra note 7.
151. See John Hill, Measure would revise process of receivership,
PROVIDENCE J., July 10, 2010, at A10.
152. State reviewing, supra note 11.
153. R.I. GEN. LAws § 45-9-1 (2010).
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markets, all to the public benefit and good."154 In order to
accomplish these policy goals, the legislation establishes a three-
tier mechanism for state intervention, allowing the state to
provide "varying levels of support and control depending on the
circumstances." 1 55
The lowest level of state intervention is the appointment of a
fiscal overseer, who is designated by the state director of revenue
either upon the request of the municipality's chief executive officer
and council, after consulting with the auditor general, or
unilaterally should the director of revenue find that any two of
several triggering events have occurred and "threaten the fiscal
well-being of the city or town, diminishing the city or town's
ability to provide for the public safety or welfare of the
citizens." 156 The primary role of the fiscal overseer is to examine
the municipality's budget and make recommendations to local
officials as to what steps are appropriate or necessary to restore
budget stability.157 Overall, the fiscal overseer provision in the
new legislation is consistent with the ideals of local self-
government embodied in the Home Rule Amendment because it
154. Id.
155. Id. §§ 45-9-1, -3, -5, -7. In evaluating the constitutionality of the
statute, a Rhode Island Superior Court characterized this as a "five-tier
mechanism," including within its framework two possible outcomes following
state intervention: the creation of a municipal department of administration
and finance following resolution of the immediate fiscal crisis, or
alternatively, authorization for the town or city to file for Chapter 9
bankruptcy should the state intervention prove ineffective. See id. §§ 45-9-7, -
10; Pfeiffer, C.A. No. PB 10-5615, at 10-11, 14-15. Because this Comment
focuses on the state's initial intervention in response to municipal financial
crisis, it will treat the provisions of the Act as establishing three levels of
intervention, with two exit mechanisms rather than characterizing the
scheme as the Superior Court did in Pfeiffer. See id.
156. R.I. GEN. LAws § 45-9-3(a)-(b) (2010). Triggering events include, a
municipality projecting a deficit for the current and coming fiscal years or
failing to file timely audits with the state for two succetsive years,
downgraded bond status or inability to access credit markets, or a failure to
properly respond to requests made by state officials regarding fiscal
conditions. Id. § 45-9-3(b).
157. Id. § 45-9-3(d). Among the powers given to the 6verseer are
recommending fiscal policies, supervising financial services and activities,
advising the municipality's fiscal officers, providing assistance with financial
matters, assisting with the development of a municipal budget, reviewing
contracts, monitoring expenditures, approving annual and supplemental
budgets, and reporting progress to the director of revenue. Id.
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does not displace local decision-makers, leaves intact mechanisms
for holding those local officials accountable, and achieves a level of
state-municipal collaboration that does not undermine the role of
local input in resolving local financial problems.
The second level of state intervention involves appointment of
a budget commission by the director of revenue. 158 Although this
mechanism existed in the previous legislation, it is substantially
revised under the new statute. 159  For example, the new
legislation expands the range of triggering events for the creation
of a budget review commission, allowing the director of revenue to
establish such a commission upon the recommendation of the
fiscal overseer or upon a finding by the overseer that the
municipality will be unable to present a balanced budget, faces a
fiscal crisis that poses an imminent threat to residents, will be
unable to achieve financial stability without the assistance of a
budget commission, or that the tax levy should not be approved. 160
Additionally, the director of revenue must establish a budget
commission if the state's division of municipal finance notifies her
that a municipality is unable to achieve a balanced budget, and
she may establish a budget commission if a municipality's chief
executive officer and council jointly request one.161 Thus, under
the new legislation, a wider variety of events may trigger the
establishment of a budget review commission, and rather than
relying exclusively on clear and objective indicators of municipal
financial distress (i.e. downgraded credit status and immediate
inability to meet pending obligations) as the prior legislation had,
the new statute relies on less objective indicators of financial
distress, while also providing a greater opportunity for early
intervention. 162 While this early intervention approach is favored
by bond-rating agencies because it calms fears that Rhode Island
law makes it too easy for municipalities to file for bankruptcy, 163
158. Id. § 45-9-5.
159. R.I. GEN. LAws § 45-9-3 (1956), amended by R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 45-9-1
to -17 (2010); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-9-5 (2010).
160. R.I. GEN. LAws § 45-9-5 (2010).
161. Id. § 45-9-5(f).
162. Then-Governor Carcieri praised the new legislation for exactly this
reason - it allows for state intervention "at the first sign of trouble." Randal
Edgar, Carcieri OKs receivership guidelines law, PROVIDENCE J., June 15,
2010, at A5.
163. See id.
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it also provides an opportunity for the state to interfere in local
affairs at a much earlier stage, and with fewer objective indicators
of financial distress than under the previous legislation.
Additionally, under the revised legislation, budget review
commissions are dominated by state-appointed members, in
contrast with the prior statute, which provided for commissions
that were primarily comprised of local officials and residents.164
Now, the five member commission (down from seven) is made up
of a municipality's chief executive officer, the president of the
town or city council, and three designees of the director of
revenue, all appointed without the input of the state
legislature.16 5 However, because the commission still acts by
majority vote, effective control under the new statute has been
shifted from local stakeholders to state appointees. Furthermore,
by eliminating the three positions on commissions reserved for
municipal residents, the new statute eliminates a unique
opportunity for local input and participation in the budget
reformation process. Finally, whereas under the old statute the
state Senate approved the appointment of a commission member,
the new statute no longer requires that check.
The powers of a budget commission are largely the same
under the new statute as they were previously, with one
important caveat: if the budget commission concludes that its
intervention will be insufficient it can recommend to the director
of revenue that a receiver be appointed, at which point the
director of revenue is required to act upon the commission's
suggestion. 166 Thus, a commission that is controlled by
individuals appointed by a single member of the executive branch
without input from the legislature is empowered under the statute
to make a unilateral determination that receivership is necessary
to resolve a municipality's budget crisis. Obviously, such a
concentration of decision-making authority in the hands of an
unelected outsider poses a threat to local control over important
issues such as municipal taxing, spending, and service provision.
At the highest level of state intervention, the director of
164. R.I. GEN. LAws § 45-9-3(a)(2) (1956), amended by R.I. GEN. LAWS §§
45-9-1 to -17 (2010); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-9-6 (2010).
165. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-9-3(a)(2) (1956), amended by R.I. GEN. LAWS §§
45-9-1 to -17 (2010); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-9-6 (2010).
166. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-9-7 (2010).
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revenue may appoint a receiver, who steps into the shoes of the
municipality's top officials, displacing locally-elected leaders, and
assumes responsibility for the day-to-day operation of the
municipality, as well as budget reformation efforts. 167
Receivership may be triggered in one of two ways: first, as
described above, upon the recommendation of the budget review
commission to the director of revenue that a receiver is necessary
to resolve the municipal financial crises, or alternatively, if the
director of revenue determines that the municipality is facing a
"fiscal emergency" and "circumstances do not allow for
appointment of a fiscal overseer or a budget commission," she may
utilize the statute's emergency provision and install a receiver
immediately.' 68 This was the provision utilized in Central Falls'
case, whereby the director of revenue appointed a receiver to
replace the temporary receiver who had been appointed by the
Superior Court.1 69 Under the statute, the receiver has:
The power to exercise any function or power of any
municipal officer or employee, board, authority, or
commission, whether elected or otherwise relating to or
impacting the fiscal stability of the city or town including,
without limitation, school and zoning matters. 170
Thus, receivership under the statute virtually eliminates local
input into the day-to-day operation of a municipality, instead
vesting complete control in an unelected official who is appointed
by a member of the state's executive branch upon either a finding
of "fiscal emergency" or the recommendation of a state-dominated
budget review commission. Clearly, this mechanism divests voter-
residents of their right to local self-government, potentially
achieving a greater level of financial stability, but at the cost of
democratic decision-making. 171
167. See id.
168. Id. § 45-9-7 to -8.
169. Pfeiffer, C.A. No. PB 10-5615, at 28 n.27.
170. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-9-7 (2010).
171. For example, upon assuming control in Central Falls, the state-
appointed Receiver demoted the mayor to an "advisory" role, explaining that
"[ylou can't have two leaders." John Hill, New administrator swiftly takes
control, PROVIDENCE J., July 20, 2010, at Al. Within months, the receiver
completely disbanded the city council, instead instituting an "Advisory Panel"
made up of what critics call "yes-men," whose attitudes are politically and
ideologically aligned with the Receiver's own views. John Hill, Receiver
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B. Reconciling Home Rule Ideals with the Need for Fiscal
Stability
Rhode Island's new fiscal oversight statute, particularly as
implemented in Central Falls' case, impinges on the authority of
locally-elected municipal officials to design and implement local
policy on behalf of their constituents. Furthermore, at the higher
levels of intervention, especially receivership, the statute deprives
local residents of a voice in the governance of their cities and
towns, displacing locally-elected officials, as well as the
municipality's governmental and political structures, and instead
vesting centralized control in a state-appointed and politically
unaccountable individual. Thus, it appears that the statute, at
least as it was applied in Central Falls' case, defies the Home Rule
Amendment's prohibition against altering the form of local
government without the approval of resident-voters. However,
when the Mayor and members of the Central Falls City Council
challenged that law on these grounds, a Rhode Island Superior
Court justice concluded that the law, even as applied in Central
Falls, did not violate the Home Rule Amendment.172
The court first addressed the claim that because the statute
was enacted retroactively to a date only four days before Central
Falls initially filed for judicial receivership, "it applie[s]
exclusively to Central Falls, and should have been subject to a
vote of the electorate in accordance with the Home Rule
Amendment." 173 However, applying the Marran framework, the
court concluded that regardless of whether the Act, by virtue of its
retroactive application, affected Central Falls differently than it
affects other Rhode Island municipalities, "on its face and by its
terms the Act applies equally to all cities and towns, including
Central Falls, and is therefore a statute of general application."174
replaces City Council, PROVIDENCE J., Nov. 10, 2010, at Al.
172. Pfeiffer, C.A. No. PB 10-5615, at 47-48. The Mayor and City Council
members challenged the law on several other grounds as well, arguing that it
violates the separation of powers and non-delegation doctrines, and that as
applied here, it violated the substantive and procedural due process rights of
Central Falls' elected officials. Id. at 29, 31, 35, 38. The court rejected each
of these claims. Id. at 48.
173. Id. at 20.
174. Id. at 20-21.
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Next, the court addressed arguments by the mayor and city
council that because the statute was aimed at Central Falls' fiscal
crises, it "fails to address an issue of statewide concern."175
However, applying the standards set out in Marran, Brancato,
and Town of East Greenwich, the court concluded that:
Where, as here, Rhode Island has consistently exercised
oversight over municipal budgets and debt obligations,
the insolvency of a city or town threatens the credit of the
state and other cities and towns, and uniform regulations
are desirable and necessary to protect the fiscal stability
of the state and its municipalities, . . . the Act affects
matters of statewide concern.176
In other words, given the threat posed by Central Falls' precarious
financial situation to surrounding communities, and the General
Assembly's traditional role overseeing municipal financial issues,
the state had a clear and legitimate interest in intervening. 177
Finally, the court addressed the argument that the Act
impermissibly altered the form of municipal government in
Central Falls by displacing a variety of appointed and elected
officials without first obtaining the necessary approval from the
voters. 178 The court noted that under the Home Rule
Amendment, "the General Assembly has no right to alter or
amend a municipality's form of government," but applying the
Marran analysis, it concluded that "although the Receiver's
powers are broad and the receivership is not limited to a
particular durational term, the Act does not permanently affect a
municipality's form of government," and therefore does not violate
the Home Rule Amendment.179
It would seem, then, that this case is controlled by Marran
insofar as Home Rule is concerned, and thus that the statute does
not infringe upon the constitutionally guaranteed rights of
municipal officials and their residents to be free from undue
interference by the state in matters of local concern. 180
175. Id. at 21-23.
176. Pfeiffer, C.A. No. PB 10-5615, at 22-23.
177. Id. at 22.
178. Id. at 23.
179. Id. at 25-26.
180. The Superior Court's decision has been appealed, and the Rhode
Island Supreme Court heard oral arguments on February 1, 2011. Court
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C. Democratic Input and the Long-Term Sustainability of Local
Fiscal Reform
Even assuming that Rhode Island's new fiscal oversight
provision does not violate any component of the Home Rule
Amendment, its application in this case reflects hastily-made
public policy choices that fail for three primary reasons to
adequately serve the underlying goal of promoting long term
financial stability in Central Falls. First, as applied in this case,
implementation of the statute via the emergency receivership
provision deprived Central Falls residents of a voice in the
process, offending the underlying ideals of the Home Rule
Amendment. To the extent that the intervention utilized here
"den[ies] residents any opportunity to participate meaningfully in
the decisionmaking process," it "send[s] the unmistakable message
that democratic control is ineffective and that the city residents
are incapable of making difficult decisions." 18 1 This message is in
diametric opposition to the democratic values underlying the
Home Rule Amendment.
Second, by eliminating the involvement of local stakeholders
in the process, the likelihood only increases that such a fiscal
disaster will occur again in Central Falls. For instance, if this
financial emergency was the result of political influences -
interest group pressures, externalized costs, or other factors that
are uniquely tied to the democratic process - by eliminating local
officials from the reform process, the state has eliminated the
need for those local officials to minimize or ameliorate negative
political pressures as they manifest themselves in the budgetary
process. On the other hand, if Central Falls' fiscal crisis was
caused not by poor fiscal management, but by independent
socioeconomic factors like a decreasing tax base or
suburbanization, utilizing a transparent reform processes in
which the electorate can participate will also have longer lasting
effects, as residents will have a greater opportunity to own and
understand the financial problems facing their city, and
participate in the difficult decision-making process that is
hears appeal, supra note 21. As of the date of this writing, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court had not yet issued a decision in this case.
181. See Missed Opportunity, supra note 52, at 750.
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essential to a long-term resolution.
Third, if poor financial management is to blame for the
current state of Central Falls' budget, the state has eliminated
important political accountability mechanisms by excluding local
officials from the reform process. For example, the current Mayor
and City Council can criticize the actions of the Receiver,
deflecting whatever blame the voters would have otherwise
attributed to them. Thus, by replacing local government actors
with a non-politically accountable manager, the state has
significantly hindered the political process as a mechanism for
dealing with fiscal mismanagement.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS
Here, the state waited until the fiscal crisis in Central Falls
had escalated, and then, in a flurry of legislative activity, hastily
passed a statute giving the director of revenue almost complete
authority to displace an entire local government in one fell swoop.
However, the writing was on the wall in Central Falls, and with
consistent, regimented oversight, the state likely could have
averted the crisis at a much earlier stage. Certainly, Central
Falls' ongoing fiscal problems were no mystery; had the proper
monitoring mechanisms been in place, the state could have
stepped in at an earlier point, precluding the need for such a
drastic intervention.18 2 Indeed, the complete elimination of
democratic control might not even have been necessary.
As noted above, state responses to municipal fiscal struggles
182. For example, when the General Assembly convened the Central Falls
Review Commission in 1991 to evaluate Central Falls' then-existing financial
crises, the Commission cited a litany of chronic factors contributing to the
City's economic struggles:
The City's current problems stem directly from its history,
geography, and demography, and its excessive reliance on property
taxes as the source of locally-derived revenues. Although many
specific decisions of the past can be questioned, the city inevitably
reached the point at which its property tax base had no more room to
grow, while its expenses continued to increase. Several cost-saving
measures and tax increases postponed, but could not ultimately
avoid, today's problems. These are of course exacerbated by the fact
that the City's people have the lowest average income in the state.
CENTRAL FALLS REVIEW COMM'N, THE REPORT OF THE CENTRAL FALLS REVIEW
COMMISSION TO THE GOVERNOR, THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, AND THE MAYOR 1
(1991).
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tend to be either reactive or proactive.183  One of the most
significant flaws in reactive policies is that they often lack early
warning systems to detect distress before an actual crises
occurs. 184  Research reveals that at least nine states have
implemented proactive monitoring and early response systems for
municipal financial distress.i8 5 In a study of these nine states,
Coe identified three best practices adopted by state governments:
monitoring systems that facilitate the prediction of fiscal distress,
early assistance to struggling municipalities to prevent the
situation from worsening, and strong authority to require (rather
than merely request) remedial action be taken by the
municipality.' 8 6 Coe found that the states that implemented all
three of these strategies were in the best position to detect and
prevent financial distress, warding off major crises.18 7 States
with early warning systems monitor a wide variety of indicators of
financial health, but researchers have identified nine key
variables that may be predictive of pending financial distress:
population growth, real taxable value growth, large real taxable
value decrease, general fund expenditures as a percentage of
taxable value, general fund operating deficit, prior general fund
operating deficits, size of general fund balance, fund deficits in the
183. Berman suggests that reactive, rather than proactive interventions
by state oversight boards are in fact "more consistent with the assumption
that local governments should conduct their own affairs and devise solutions
to their own problems," because under the reactive approach, the state
becomes involved only after local officials have failed to effectively ward off
crisis, and the state's role is therefore more limited. See Berman, supra note
44, at 68. Conversely, Berman asserts that a proactive approach implies
ongoing supervision by state actors, which "may lead to greater local
controversy because it is uninvited and more directly conflicts with the norm
of local autonomy." Id. However, while the supervisory role of state officials
necessary under a proactive approach may prove an annoyance to local
officials who seek to make local fiscal decisions unencumbered by state
oversight, proactive monitoring and early intervention is unlikely to lead to
the wholesale loss of local control by preventing the acute financial crisis that
may trigger a reactive and extreme intervention.
184. Philip Kloha et al., Developing and Testing a Composite Model to
Predict Local Fiscal Distress, 65 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 313, 313-14 (2005).
185. Coe, supra note 34, at 760. These include Florida, Kentucky,
Maryland, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio,
and Pennsylvania. Id. at tbl. 1.
186. Id.
187. See id.
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current or previous year, and general long-term debt as a
percentage of taxable value. 188
As an alternative to the hasty and late intervention utilized
by the Rhode Island state government in response to Central
Falls' insolvency, Rhode Island should embrace an early
intervention model, like the one used in North Carolina.18 9 North
Carolina's system was initially devised during the Great
Depression, and emphasizes ongoing state oversight of municipal
finances and early, but limited, intervention.190 North Carolina's
approach adopts all three of the best practices described by Coe
and is considered to be a model in the United States: that state
has the most municipal units receiving top credit scores anywhere
in the country. 191 Moreover, since 1932, North Carolina's state-
level oversight agency has been required to takeover
municipalities in only four instances.192 North Carolina's success
is largely attributable to its comprehensive and sophisticated
monitoring system, whereby a state agency consistently evaluates
the financial health and debt management of local governments,
watching for early warning signs.193 Municipalities are also
required to submit semi-annual financial statements to the state
monitoring agency, and must obtain state approval before issuing
local debt. 194  Given this consistent and comprehensive
188. Kloha et al., supra note 184, at 317-19. Weighing each variable and
applying the scale to Michigan's municipalities, the authors found that this
metric correctly identified three financially distressed municipalities that
were eventually taken over by the state. Id. at 319.
189. See Reviving Cities, supra note 36, at 679.
190. See Coe, supra note 34, at 761.
191. See Reviving Cities, supra note 36, at 679; Coe, supra note 34, at 761.
Not only does North Carolina's state-level monitoring agency carefully review
financial reports submitted by municipalities on a regular basis, but it also
requires state approval for the issuance of new bonds and provides immediate
assistance to municipalities whose financial reports show warning signs of
distress. Id. at 761-62.
192. Coe, supra note 34, at 763. To put this figure in perspective, North
Carolina's oversight agency continuously monitors approximately 1,100
municipalities for signs of financial distress. See id. at 760 tbl. 1.
193. Reviving Cities, supra note 36, at 679-80. Kimhi acknowledges that
when municipal financial crises reach a level that requires state takeover,
local autonomy is necessarily sacrificed, albeit temporarily. Chapter 9 of the
Bankruptcy Code, supra note 31, at 390. However, to the extent that ongoing
oversight prevents the escalation of crises the net impact of continuous
oversight is likely less detrimental to local autonomy and decision making.
194. Reviving Cities, supra note 36, at 679-80.
PRESERVING LOCAL AUTONOMY
monitoring, the state is able to identify warning signs at an early
stage, and work closely with local officials to resolve budgetary
issues before they snowball out of control. 19 5 In fact, when the
Fitch IBCA Rating Agency reviewed North Carolina's procedure in
1999, it concluded that "[t]he frequency and thoroughness of
review by the [state's monitoring agency], coupled with its record
of assuming fiscal control before stress leads to crisis, provides
additional credit strength to most local issuers." 19 6  North
Carolina's proactive approach and constant "surveillance" of
municipal finances appears to have achieved unparalleled success
in preventing the type of municipal fiscal crises that requires
immediate and sweeping state intervention. 197 A corollary benefit
to North Carolina's oversight approach is that by reducing the risk
of catastrophic financial crisis among municipalities and
increasing creditor confidence, interest rates available for
municipal borrowing are lower, creating an overall costs
savings. 198
As compared to the recent ex-ante intervention of the Rhode
Island state government into Central Falls' budget crises, a
proactive approach preserves local control over local issues by
minimizing the need for large-scale state intervention. 199
Certainly a statute mandating regular fiscal reports from all
Rhode Island towns and cities would not violate the Home Rule
Amendment, and its interference with local government would be
195. Id.
196. Id. (quoting Richard P. Larkin & Jeff Schaub, State of North Carolina
Local Government Commission: Credit Enhancement Program Review, FITCH
IBCA TAX-SUPPORTED SPECIAL REPORT, Mar. 29, 1999, at 5).
197. Id. at 683 (quoting Richard P. Larkin & Jeff Schaub, State of North
Carolina Local Government Commission: Credit Enhancement Program
Review, FITCH IBCA TAX-SUPPORTED SPECIAL REPORT, Mar. 29, 1999, at 5).
198. Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code, supra note 31 at 394. Because
creditors trust that North Carolina's oversight agency will step in to prevent
a default, they are also more willing to lend money to the state's
municipalities, and at a lower interest rate, saving the state's municipalities
millions of dollars every year. Id.
199. In fact, when the General Assembly authorized the Central Falls
Review Commission in the early 1990s, the body's role was "to work with City
officials and assist in solving problems; not to perform any of the functions of
the Mayor, City Council, or School Committee." CENTRAL FALLS REVIEW
COMM'N, supra note 182, at 4 (emphasis added). Thus, it is obvious that a
state takeover is not the only viable solution to municipal financial crises in
Rhode Island.
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minimal from a democratic integrity standpoint. In fact,
mandating such reporting and oversight might actually enhance
transparency at the local level, providing resident-voters with an
additional method for evaluating the performance of their local
officials. Such an approach would also allow for more limited
intervention at the early stages of financial distress, through
which local policy makers could retain at least some authority to
act on behalf of their constituents. In the long run, ongoing
supervision will not only contribute to enhanced local autonomy
by limiting the need for sweeping, emergency intervention, but it
will also contribute to greater municipal financial health overall,
and consequently lower interest rates for all of Rhode Island's
municipalities. 20 0
IV. CONCLUSION
Whether or not Rhode Island's new financial oversight statute
violates the Home Rule Amendment as applied in this case, it
certainly does not comport with the underlying ideals of local
democratic government embodied in the Amendment. To the
extent that the receivership provision precludes local input and
participation in the budget reform process, it undermines the
democratic process and is thus unlikely to produce lasting change.
Although no other Rhode Island municipalities have reached the
same crisis point as Central Falls,201 fiscal mismanagement at the
local level poses a threat to all of Rhode Island's towns and cities,
and must be managed or controlled in some way by the state.
However, rather than implementing rushed, ex-ante responses,
the state, its municipalities, and their citizens would be better
served by a proactive approach.
200. See Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code, supra note 31, at 392.
201. At the time Central Falls first filed for receivership, at least two
other Rhode Island municipalities - Woonsocket and North Providence -
faced similarly severe financial distress, although neither had reached the
same crisis point as Central Falls. See City in Receivership, supra note 1. As
of the writing of this Comment, state officials were working with three
distressed municipalities in addition to Central Falls, prompting the House
Speaker to suggest that "Central Falls may not be just the odd black swan, it
may actually be the canary in the mine shaft." Randal Edgar, Central Falls
is the tip of the iceberg, PROVIDENCE J., Jan. 9, 2011, at AL.
